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The purpose of this report is to investigate and explain conflicts involved in the ongoing 
licensing process whereby TransCanada is attempting to obtain permission from the U.S. 
Department of State to build a pipeline (named Keystone XL) from the tar sand oil fields of 
Alberta, Canada to the Gulf Coast. The economic concepts important in guiding this 
investigation are: (1) rules are important, (2) moral hazard, and (3) corporate strategic 
misinformation
1
.  
 Economists emphasize the importance of rules for structuring and determining the 
working of economic institutions and the social institutions that support, regulate, and enforce 
the economic institutions.  The kind of economic structure that emerges from the proposed 
Keystone XL pipeline very much depends on which rules are followed.  The term “rules” is used 
here to mean laws, norms, standards, criteria, and regulations.  As Nobel Prize economist Elinor 
Ostrom and her co-author Xavier Basurto have recently emphasized, rules are the result of 
efforts to achieve order and predictability by defining actions that are required, permitted, or 
forbidden to be taken in particular situations “or face the likelihood of being monitored, and 
sanctioned in a predictable fashion” (2011, p. 322).  “A major task for those studying a problem 
area is to identify the convergence of various rules, socioecological properties, and situations” 
(Hayden 2009, p. 111).  The task here is to investigate particular situations of the Keystone XL 
pipeline licensing process and to identify and discuss whether there are conflicts with rules.  If 
the pipeline is not constructed according to appropriate rules, the economic results it produces 
cannot be considered efficient. 
 A moral hazard is a perverse incentive that rewards one organization for exploiting 
another. Moral hazards are created by institutions—often government agencies. Moral hazards 
are generated when perverse incentives are provided that encourage an organization to act in a 
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way so that it hurts others in the economy. For example, if a government agency fails to enforce 
regulations to control adverse corporate behavior, the hazard is that more and more corporations 
will undertake the immoral behavior that is detrimental to society at large.  
 Corporate strategic misinformation is when corporations strategically misinform a 
government agency; for example, when a corporation provides an environmental protection 
agency with incorrect pollution data.  
 We see below that these three economic concepts are important for understanding 
conflicts in the Keystone XL pipeline licensing process.  
 
Diagram of Conflicts in the Keystone XL Licensing Process 
Figure 1 is a diagram to outline where conflicts do and do not exist. It is a way to present 
conflicts found with regard to interacting organizational institutions.  The entities printed in 
italics in Figure 1 were not found to be involved in conflicts. Between the organizations and 
persons in Figure 1 are directed lines to indicate what is being delivered. Systems function 
through deliveries among the parts, so this report is organized around deliveries made among key 
players in the licensing process. Deliveries are designated by alphabetical letters in Figure 1, and 
the explanation of the directed lines is organized in the text by the same letters, as follows.  
 A. TransCanada’s Delivery to the Department of State:  Directed line A in Figure 1 indicates 
that TransCanada submitted a license application to the U.S. Department of State for permission 
to build a proposed pipeline for transporting heavy crude from Canada‟s tar-sand fields in 
Alberta to refineries along the Gulf Coast.  The pipeline that is named Keystone XL must be 
approved by the Department of State instead of the U.S. Department of Environmental 
Protection (EPA) because the pipeline comes from a foreign country. 
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B. Department of State’s Delivery to TransCanada:  Directed line B in Figure 1 represents 
one of the first steps in the process of evaluating the license application.  It was a misstep.  This 
misstep was for Department of State to assign to TransCanada the task of soliciting and 
screening bids for contractors to complete the important environmental impact statement (EIS) of 
TransCanada‟s own license application. This misstep laid the groundwork for a series of further 
missteps outlined in Figure 1 that generated a process dominated by conflicts, especially 
financial conflicts of interest. A corporation should not be involved in the selection of a 
contractor to assess the corporation‟s own license application.  
 C. TransCanada’s Delivery to Department of State:   The second misstep, and major 
financial conflict of interest, is for TransCanada to recommend that its own longtime consultant, 
Cardno Entrix, be considered to be the consultant to the Department of State to review 
TransCanada‟s own application to build the Keystone XL.  This is indicated by the directed line 
C in Figure 1. An assistant secretary of the Department of State stated that TransCanada 
managed the bidding process to find a contractor and recommended three candidates, with 
Cardno Entrix being placed at the top of the list (The New York Times, October 7, 2011). 
 In its own marketing material Cardno Entrix makes it clear that TransCanada is a major 
client, so its future income depends on how satisfied TransCanada is with its analysis of the 
license application. In addition to being a past consultant to TransCanada, there is potential for 
Cardno Entrix “to garner more work involving the pipeline” because Cardno Entrix “provides a 
wide range of pipeline services, including assisting in oil spill response” (The New York Times, 
October 7, 2011).  This means the future could hold great profits for Cardno Entrix if 
TransCanada likes the work completed by Cardno Entrix and if TransCanada builds Keystone 
XL, because TransCanada will need service responses to inevitable pipeline leaks and breaks. 
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 TransCanada‟s consultant-selection activity creates not only a financial conflict of 
interest, it also creates a conflict with federal law in a case where federal law requires an 
impartial environmental analysis for project licensing.  It is a conflict with law because the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires that outside contractors be hired “solely by 
the lead agency” and that contractors should “execute a disclosure statement” that the contractors 
“have no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project” (40 C.F.R. Sec. 1506.5(c)).  
Cardno Entrix does have a financial interest in the project because of its long-term consulting 
relationship with TransCanada and because of the present value of future expected income from 
contracts with TransCanada.  As stated by law professor Oliver A. Houck, who is an expert on 
NEPA, Cardno Entrix had a financial conflict of interest because it has a “„financial interest in 
the outcome of the project‟”; thus,  “„[t]heir primary loyalty is getting this project through in the 
way the client wants‟” (The New York Times,, October 8, 2011). 
D. Bidirectional Delivery Between TransCanada and Cardno Entrix:  Bidirectional line D 
represents the bidirectional exchange of money from TransCanada for consulting services from 
Cardno Entrix (see C above). An organization dependent on a corporation for consulting service 
income should not have been considered an appropriate organization to serve as a consultant to 
make an independent decision about that corporation.  
E. Bidirectional Delivery Between TransCanada and Cardno Entrix: Bidirectional line E 
represents another aspect of what was explained above in C.  Directed line E has arrows on both 
ends to indicate that Cardno Entrix will be in a position to provide pipeline services to 
TransCanada‟s Keystone XL, if it is constructed, in return for money provided to Cardno Entrix 
from TransCanada. To use the language of economists, there is a present value to future expected 
income. Cardno Entrix could not expect that income if they did anything to decrease 
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TransCanada‟s chances of getting the license application for Keystone XL approved. This 
establishes a major financial conflict of interest.  
F. TransCanada’s Delivery to Cardno Entrix: Directed line F indicates a further financial 
conflict of interest because the Department of State had TransCanada make direct payments to 
Cardno Entrix for the EIS report being prepared for Department of State. “TransCanada pays the 
consultant directly . . .” (The New York Times, October 7, 2011).  Because Department of State 
did not maintain control over the payment to Cardno Entrix, it could not monitor what the money 
was being spent for or the quality of the analysis. As this arrangement decreased Department of 
State‟s oversight, it enhanced TransCanada‟s control over the consultant. 
 G.  Cardno Entrix’s Delivery to Department of State:  Directed line G represents the delivery 
of the EIS Report from Cardno Entrix to the Department of State. This is the report that 
TransCanada recommended to Department of State that Cardno Entrix be considered to complete 
(see B and C).  It is the EIS report that TransCanada paid Cardno Entrix to complete (see F). 
H.  Department of State’s Delivery to TransCanada:  Directed line H indicates Department of 
State‟s distribution of the EIS report completed by Cardno Entrix to TransCanada (see G).  
I.  Professor Stansbury’s Delivery to Department of State:  Directed line I indicates the 
delivery of the report from Professor Stansbury‟s analysis of the Draft EIS to the Department of 
State.  Professor John S. Stansbury is a University of Nebraska-Lincoln engineering professor 
who specializes in water engineering and who has been a consultant teaching the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers how to do risk assessments. “His report is based on publicly available 
information TransCanada and federal regulators have disclosed about the project and past 
pipeline spills, and some of his colleagues reviewed the report” (Bloomberg Businessweek, July 
11, 2011).  Stansbury said neither TransCanada nor the regulators evaluating the proposed 
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Keystone XL pipeline have properly considered the risks and, additionally, that those risks have 
the potential to create serious damage. According to Stansbury, “„[t]hey presented what I thought 
was an unrealistically optimistic picture of the impacts from the pipeline‟” (Bloomberg 
Businessweek, July 11, 2011). His analysis found that “the potential frequency and magnitude of 
oil spills from Keystone Xl were intentionally underestimated in the environmental impact 
statement” (Omaha World Herald, October 16, 2011).  He completed the analysis for the report 
without direction to do so, without instruction or direction about how to complete the analysis, 
and without monetary compensation from any institutional organization. There are no lines of 
delivery directed to Professor Stansbury that indicate any financial conflict of interest for him.  
J. TransCanada’s Delivery to Department of State.  Directed line J indicates TransCanada‟s 
negative response to the report that Professor Stansbury sent to the Department of State.  
Consistent with the Department of State‟s allowing TransCanada to exert influence over the 
selection of the contractor to complete the EIS (see B and C), the Department of State did not 
turn to an independent third party to analyze professor Stansbury‟s report.  Instead, the 
Department of State requested that TransCanada provide a response to the Stansbury report, and 
accepted the response of TransCanada about the analysis of its contractor‟s EIS.  This means 
TransCanada is offering comment where it has a financial conflict of interest.  The State 
Department includes TransCanada‟s response verbatim in the Final EIS (Volume 8, Appendix V) 
without comment, as if it is the truth, thereby allowing the party with a financial conflict of 
interest to have the final word. 
K.  Professor Stansbury’s Delivery to Department of State.  Directed line J indicates that 
Professor Stansbury (see I) delivers a response to the response of TransCanada (see J).  As 
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explained above, there is no indication of a financial conflict of interest with regard to Professor 
Stansbury.  
L.  TransCanada Delivers to Department of State:  Compounding the financial conflict of 
interest, TransCanada has provided money to pay for hearings to take comments on its own EIS, 
as indicated by directed line L.  This is like paying money to the Department of State, which 
should have used taxpayer money to sponsor the hearings so that TransCanada would not have 
been in a position to manipulate the hearing process. This is another misstep similar to the 
granting of power by Department of State to Cardno Entrix for control over the hearings (see M). 
M.  Department of State’s Delivery to Cardno Entrix.  Directed line M indicates that 
Department of State granted control of the hearings to Cardno Entrix regarding the EIS that was 
completed by Cardno Entrix‟s EIS.  “The U.S. Department of State public hearings . . . are under 
the purview of Cardno Entrix . . .  (ThinkProgress, September 28, 2011; see also Department of 
State‟s Final EIS). This is an obvious conflict of interest, and it was expressed as Cardno Entrix 
controlled the structure and mechanics of the hearings, access in the buildings, where the 
hearings were held, and so forth. 
N.  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Delivery to Department of State: Directed line 
N indicates that the EPA has delivered negative critiques of Department of State‟s two Draft 
EISs completed prior to the final EIS. The EPA found the EISs prepared by Cardno Entrix about 
the Keystone XL to be inadequate and providing insufficient information (The New York Times, 
October 7, 2011). No line is directed toward EPA; thus, there is no financial conflict of interest 
expressed.  
O.  Congressional Research Service’s Delivery to Department of State: Directed line O 
indicates that the Congressional Research Service (CRS) provided a memorandum to 
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Department of State regarding oil pipeline siting authority. The memorandum clarifies that: “The 
federal government does not have siting authority for oil pipelines even interstate pipelines. No  
. . . statutory language requires oil pipeline owners and operators to obtain certification from 
FERC or any other federal agency. In the absence of federal government siting authority, state 
laws establish the primary siting authority for oil pipelines, including interstate oil pipelines.” 
(CRS September 20, 2010, p. 5). No financial or other conflict of interest was found for CRS. 
P.  TransCanada’s Delivery to The Perryman Group:  TransCanada contracted with The 
Perryman Group of Waco, Texas to complete an analysis of the costs and benefits that would be 
forthcoming from Keystone XL
2
.  Perryman Group has numerous kinds of conflicts involved in 
its report for TransCanada.  Directed line P indicates that TransCanada allowed Perryman Group 
to avoid all kinds of normal standards that would be expected in a study dealing with the analysis 
of costs and benefits of a major project like Keystone XL (see S and T below.) 
 The first conflict involved is that the staff of professionals presented on the Perryman 
Group website does not have the capacity to adequately complete such a study.  The only 
economist is M. Ray Perryman.  No one else listed, according to Perryman‟s website, performs 
the kind of research activities needed to complete a study on economic costs and benefits.  One 
economist is not sufficient to do the job.  TransCanada had to be aware of the insufficient size 
and capacity of the staff.  
 A second conflict is the large number of research projects completed by the Perryman 
Group in recent years.  It is not possible to adequately complete so many projects with a small 
staff and only one economist, especially when that economist is the company‟s CEO and spends 
time making numerous speeches.  The many Perryman Group reports perused have only one 
name as the sole author—that of M. Ray Perryman.  It is completely in conflict with reality to 
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expect one person to do quality work on so many reports. Again, TransCanada should have been 
aware of Perryman‟s track record. 
 Third, the Perryman report for TransCanada is in conflict with most of the criteria for 
analysis that have been established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), as well as standards in the economics profession.   
 It is well understood that estimates need to include environmental costs and benefits for a 
project‟s life from cradle-to-grave.  Cradle-to-grave means from resource extraction to use to 
disposal.  This was not done with the Perryman report.  Standards emphasized by OMB are 
found in “Circular A-94:  Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analyses of Federal 
Programs.”  Standards that Perryman ignored from OMB‟s recommendations include the 
following. 
 The standard criterion for deciding whether a program can be qualified on economic 
principles is net present value (p. 3). 
 “Quantifying benefits and costs is worthwhile, even when it is not feasible to assign 
monetary values; physical measurements may be possible and useful” (p. 3). 
 Analysis should include the evaluation of alternatives, to include doing nothing (p. 4). 
 “Both intangible and tangible benefits and costs should be recognized.”  The relevant 
concept is broader than private-sector production (p. 5). 
 Because uncertainty is basic to analysis, its effects should be analyzed and reported.  
“Useful information in such a report would include the key sources of uncertainty; 
expected value estimates of outcomes; the sensitivity of results to important sources of 
uncertainty; and, where possible, the probability distributions of benefits, costs, and net 
benefits” (p. 10). 
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 GAO‟s Cost Guide (2009) emphasizes the use of “established methods and valid data”  
(p. i) for making estimates.  The “twelve steps of a high-quality cost estimating process” that are 
explained in the document are outlined in its Table 2 (pp. 9-11).  The Perryman report is in 
conflict with most of the estimating standards mentioned.  Some of the standards with which the 
Perryman report is in conflict are as follows: 
 Document the model.  
 Define technology implications.  “Determine technology refresh cycles, technology 
assumptions, and new technology to be developed.” (p. 9). 
 Define security needs and risk items. 
 Clearly define what the estimate excludes. 
 Specify the equipment and other resources the government is to furnish. 
 Document all pertinent information, including an assessment of data reliability and 
accuracy. 
 Compare estimates against independent estimates. 
 “Conduct risk and uncertainty analysis.” (p. 10). 
 Document all steps used to develop the estimate. 
 “Describe in detail the estimating methodology and rationale used …”  (p. 11). 
 The Perryman report is in conflict with all these normally accepted standards for making 
economic estimates. In the report, Perryman states that his firm “was asked to conduct a 
comprehensive economic impact analysis of the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline” (Perryman 
2010, p. 2).  It would be necessary to meet the standards suggested by EPA and GAO, as well as 
by the economics profession, before such an analysis could be considered comprehensive
3
. 
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 Beyond the conflicts due to staff inadequacy and failure to apply normally accepted 
standards for analysis, the Perryman Group is involved with a number of different kinds of 
conflicts of interest.  
 First, the money and contract for the study came directly from TransCanada, which has a 
financial interest in the outcomes of the study.  That is a slippery slope.  Such an arrangement 
generates a moral-hazard situation that can lead to the presentation of strategic misinformation, 
as has been documented here.   
 Second, the data used in the study came directly from TransCanada, which has a financial 
interest in presenting data consistent with that financial interest (see Q).  The Perryman Group 
should have insisted on developing the database, or refused to take the contract in order to avoid 
the obvious financial conflict of interest. 
 Third, the Perryman Group completes studies for large corporations involved in the 
petroleum industry (see R). The petroleum industry as a whole is very much in support of the 
Keystone XL pipeline, as is clear from the active advocacy efforts (see W) and EIS assistance 
(see V) by the American Petroleum Institute.  It is to Perryman‟s financial interest to complete 
the study for TransCanada in a manner consistent with the wishes of the petroleum industry in 
order to assist Perryman in getting future contracts with that industry. 
Q.  TransCanada’s Delivery to The Perryman Group:  Directed line Q indicates that the 
database for the study that TransCanada paid the Perryman Group to complete for TransCanada 
came directly from TransCanada (Perryman 2010, pp. 22 and 37).  As stated above (see P), this 
creates a financial conflict of interest.  In addition, it is in conflict with valid scientific work 
because there was no explanation in the Perryman Group report about the methodology or 
standards used by TransCanada to generate the data. 
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R. Bidirectional Delivery Between Oil and Gas Corporations and The Perryman Group: 
Directed line R indicates dollars paid to Perryman Group by major petroleum corporations to pay 
for consulting completed by the Perryman Group for the petroleum corporations. According to 
the Perryman Group‟s website, there have been consulting contracts and payments from 
Browning-Ferris Industries, Atlantic Richfield, Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, and Occidental 
Petroleum Company. This creates a financial conflict of interest on the part of Perryman Group 
with regard to the TransCanada study (see P). The case of Chevron is an example. Chevron 
reported in its lobbying disclosure report to the federal government that it had focused federal 
lobbying in support of the Keystone XL pipeline (Omaha World Herald, September 18, 2011).     
S. The Perryman Group’s Delivery to TransCanada: Directed line S indicates that 
Perryman‟s report was delivered to TransCanada.  
U.  Cornell University Global Labor Institute’s Delivery to TransCanada and Department 
of State:  Directed lines U are the delivery by Cornell University Global Labor Institute to 
TransCanada and the Department of State of a report completed by the former that is a critique 
of the Perryman report.  The Global Labor Institute‟s report, Pipe Dreams?  Jobs Gained, Jobs 
Lost by the Construction of Keystone XL (September 2011), methodically explains the many 
flaws of the Perryman report—exaggerated job creation, exaggerated manufacturing in the U.S., 
failure to properly define overall cost and project-related spending, lack of transparency (2011).  
The Global Labor Institute‟s report is well documented, well written, and readily available, so 
there is no reason to repeat its findings here, especially since the concern here is with conflicts.  
The Global Labor Institute study clarifies that the Perryman report suffered from its conflicts of 
interest and conflicts with methodological standards explained in P, Q and R.  The Cornell 
University Global Labor Institute is not involved in a financial conflict of interest situation with 
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any of the other organizations involved with the Keystone XL licensing process, indicated by the 
absence of lines directed to it in Figure 1.  
T.  Bidirectional Delivery Between Oil and Gas Corporations and American Petroleum 
Institute.  Bidirectional line T indicates oil and gas corporations‟ delivery of money to the 
American Petroleum Institute in return for membership.  Due to the petroleum industry‟s 
expectation of profit from Keystone XL, its members have demonstrated strong support for the 
pipeline. Consequently, American Petroleum Institute has mounted a strong lobbying effort to 
promote the pipeline. 
V. American Petroleum Institute Delivery to Cardno Entrix: Directional line V specifies the 
assistance provided by the American Petroleum Institute to Cardno Entrix for completion of the 
EIS. John Kerekes, American Petroleum Institute‟s regional manager in the Midwest, said, with 
regard to Keystone XL, “„We've been engaged from the beginning. We worked on the draft and 
supplemental and final environmental impact statement‟” (OpenSecrets.org, September 28, 
2011). 
W. Bidirectional Delivery Between American Petroleum Institute and TransCanada: 
Bidirectional line W indicates the common advocacy and lobbying activities of American 
Petroleum Institute and TransCanada in support of Keystone XL, to include officials of both 
organizations holding media conferences together.  
X.  TransCanada’s Delivery to TransCanada’s Lobbyists:  Lobbying for a corporate client 
has an inherent financial conflict of interest in that lobbyists have a financial interest to continue 
to get paid by their client.  Such a conflict establishes a moral hazard situation that can encourage 
the lobbyist to distribute corporate strategic misinformation.  Directed line X indicates the 
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payments made by TransCanada to its lobbyists. For example, it has spent about $800,000 on 
federal lobbying through the first half of 2011 (Omaha World Herald, September 18, 2011).   
Y and Z.  Bidirectional Delivery Between TransCanada Lobbyists and Department of 
State: Directed lines Y and Z indicate the long-term connections between TransCanada‟s 
lobbyists and Department of State personnel and the access Department of State personnel gave 
to the lobbyists.  The long-term connections between the two sets of personnel have led to a 
conflict on the part of Department of State to maintain an objective evaluation of TransCanada‟s 
permit application.  The personal relationships overrode a requirement to base decisions on valid 
methodologies and databases, and to ignore excellent studies that indicated weaknesses in 
Keystone XL‟s permit application. The personal relationships are a result of Hillary Clinton‟s 
position as Secretary of the Department of State.  The connections came about because 
TransCanada‟s three lobbying firms at the federal level hired high-echelon personnel from 
Hillary Clinton‟s campaign for president, President Bill Clinton‟s Administration, and President 
Barack Obama‟s campaign for president.  This gave them great ability to reach people—to 
include Secretary Hillary Clinton—in the Department of State.  Furthermore, the lobbying firms 
themselves were major fundraisers for Hillary Clinton‟s campaign.  These relationships led to the 
following conduct. 
 Cozy and collaborative relationships existed between government employees and 
lobbyists. 
 Department of State officials coached TransCanada officials. 
 Department of State officials provided insider information to TransCanada. 
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 Cheerleading email and memos were sent by Department of State personnel to 
TransCanada‟s lobbyists when the latter accomplished some goal on TransCanada‟s 
behalf. 
 Department of State created a lack of transparency regarding contacts with 
TransCanada‟s lobbyists. 
 Department of State failed to comply with Freedom of Information Act requirements—
requests for documents were not produced until numerous requests were filed. 
The details, people, and lobbying firms involved in this conduct have been explained in The New 
York Times (October 7, 2011), The Washington Post (September 22, 2011), and DeSmogBlog 
October 5, 2011). 
 The nexus of the conflicts of the TransCanada lobbyists and Department of State 
employees is probably the most important determinant of all the problems encountered with the 
Keystone XL decision process.  The TransCanada lobbyists were overtaken by financial conflicts 
of interest, and the Department of State employees were overtaken by personal and political 
connections, which caused the employees to act in conflict with expected standards of care, 
competence, and prudence. Thus, Department of State did not select or heed unbiased third-party 
contractors and analysts. 
AA.  Bidirectional Delivery Between Koch Industries, Inc./Koch Brothers and Oil andGas 
Corporations:  Bidirectional line AA indicates that Koch Industries/Koch Brothers owns stock 
in and receives income from numerous oil and gas corporations.  Given the extensive multi-
industry ownership holdings of Koch Industries, it is difficult to find areas where that 
conglomerate does not have a financial conflict of interest. 
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BB. Bidirectional Delivery Between Koch Industries, Inc./Koch Brothers and 
TransCanada: Beyond Koch Industries‟ monetary earnings gained because of TransCanada‟s 
pipeline activities (see CC), the two also have other common business interests.  This is 
represented by bidirectional line BB.  Koch Industries is part owner in corporations that are 
mining the tar sand, and those corporations want the pipeline in order to be able to transport what 
has been mined and to be able to mine more of it.  Koch Industries also owns a crude oil terminal 
and refinery that does initial refining to prepare the tar sand for pipeline transportation (Reuters, 
February 10, 2011). Koch Industries and TransCanada have common business interests in 
building the pipeline, and, thus, both have an inherent financial conflict of interest when creating 
and distributing information about the pipeline. 
CC.  TransCanada’s Delivery to Koch Industries, Inc./Koch Brothers:  Directional line CC 
indicates monetary earnings will be gained by Koch Industries because of  TransCanada‟s 
Keystone XL pipeline. This gain comes through Flint Hills Resources, which is a subsidiary of 
Koch Industries.  In a form submitted to the Canadian Energy Board, Flint Hills indicates that it 
has a substantial interest in the Keystone XL pipeline. “In 2009, Flint Hills Resources Canada 
LP, an Alberta-based subsidiary of Koch Industries, applied for—and won—„intervenor status‟ 
in the National Energy Board hearings that led to Canada‟s 2010 approval of its 327-mile portion 
of the pipeline. . . . In the form it submitted to the Energy Board, Flint Hills wrote that it „is 
among Canada's largest crude oil purchasers, shippers and exporters. [. . .] Consequently, Flint 
Hills has a direct and substantial interest in the application for the pipeline under consideration. 
To be approved as an intervenor, Flint Hills had to have some degree of "business interest" in 
Keystone XL” (The Guardian, October 5, 2011).  
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 In addition, Koch Industries, Inc. and Flint Hills Resources have interlocking 
directorships, with the President and Chief Operating Officer of Koch Industries serving on the 
board of directors of both corporations.  Furthermore, Flint Hills Resources has an interlocking 
directorship with Georgia-Pacific, which is also owned by Koch Industries.  There are five 
directors and officers from Koch Industries on the board of Georgia-Pacific (Bloomberg 
Businessweek, Business Exchange, July 15, 2011). Thus, Flint Hills Resources is well integrated 
into decision making at Koch Industries. Given its financial interest through Flint Hills, Koch 
Industries is in a conflict of interest situation regarding any activity it undertakes in support of 
the Keystone XL pipeline.  
DD.  Koch Industries, Inc./Koch Brothers Delivery to Alberta Canada and Gulf Coast 
Refineries:  Bidirectional line DD indicates that Koch Industries owns stock in refineries in 
Alberta, Canada and the Gulf Coast—at both ends of the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline.  The 
refinery activity in Canada is to prepare the tar sand for pipeline transport and in the Gulf Coast 
to complete the final product.  As a stockholder, Koch Industries receives profit from the 
refineries.  Such a financial interest leads to a conflict of interest when Koch engages in activities 
related to Keystone XL.   
EE.  Koch Industries, Inc./Koch Brothers Delivery to Institute for Energy 
Research/American Energy Alliance.  The organization Nebraskans for Jobs and Energy 
Independence exhibits numerous financial conflicts of interest with respect to the dissemination 
of information.  We begin to outline those conflicts with directed line EE that indicates Koch 
Industries provided funding to the Institute for Energy Research for many years (until 2007).  
According to the American Energy Alliance‟s website, it was started in 1989 and is the advocacy 
arm of The Institute for Energy Research.  The president of American Energy Alliance joined 
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Institute for Energy Research and American Energy Alliance after working as a lobbyist for 
Koch Industries. 
FF.  Koch Industries, Inc./Koch Brothers Delivery to Americans for Prosperity:  Directed 
line FF indicates the funds sent to Americans for Prosperity.  David H. Koch was a founder of 
Americans for Prosperity and continues to support it.  Americans for Prosperity does not attempt 
to overcome its financial conflict of interest situation from receiving money from Koch while 
distributing information and supporting other groups consistent with Koch‟s interest and 
ideology about the Keystone XL. 
GG.  Bidirectional Delivery Between Americans for Prosperity and American Energy 
Alliance:  Bidirectional line GG indicates that the two Koch-related organizations, Americans 
for Prosperity and American Energy Alliance, form alliances with each other to provide each 
other with support and assistance to support the Koch agenda for the Keystone XL pipeline 
(Lincoln Journal Star, October 18, 2011). They do not try to overcome the conflict of interest 
situation generated by the money they receive from Koch; instead, they embrace it. 
HH.  Bidirectional Delivery Between Americans for Prosperity and Nebraskans for Jobs 
and Energy Independence:  Bidirectional line HH demonstrates that Americans for Prosperity 
and Nebraskans for Jobs and Energy Independence undertake common activities and distribute 
similar propaganda that support and reinforce each others‟ message about TransCanada‟s 
proposed Keystone XL pipeline. 
II.  TransCanada’s Lobbyists Delivery to Nebraskans for Jobs and Energy Independence:  
Directional line II indicates that TransCanada lobbyist Kissel/E&S of Lincoln, Nebraska delivers 
Joseph D. Kohout (Kissel/E&S website) to Nebraskans for Jobs and Energy Independence. 
According to a transcript of the Nebraska Unicameral‟s Natural Resources Committee, Kohout is 
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“registered lobbyist for TransCanada and its affiliated pipelines here in Nebraska” (February 17, 
2011, p. 39).    Kohout is an officer (Secretary/Treasurer) and a member of the three-member 
board of directors of Nebraskans for Jobs and Energy Independence, which is a nonprofit 
corporation (Nonprofit Corporation Biennial Report, State of Nebraska, No. 10140228 Filed 
April 2, 2011). 
JJ.  TransCanada Delivery to Nebraskans for Jobs and Energy Independence:  The 
directional line JJ indicates that TransCanada delivers an employee of TransCanada, Beth 
Jensen, to serve on the three-member board of directors of Nebraskans for Jobs and Energy 
Independence, which is a nonprofit corporation (Nonprofit Corporation Biennial Report, State of 
Nebraska,  No. 10140228 Filed April 2, 2011). Jensen is Director, Government Relations for 
TransCanada (MonDak Energy Alliance Agenda Update, February 23, 2011, Document 
Transcript).  
LL.  Bidirectional Delivery Between TransCanada and Laborers Local 1140 Delivery:  The 
bidirectional line LL indicates a labor agreement between TransCanada and Laborers Local 
1140.  According to Ron Kaminski (business manager for the union), the agreement between the 
two is for workers for the pipeline (Omaha World Herald, February 2, 2011). 
KK.  Laborers Local 1140 Delivers to Nebraskans  for Jobs and Energy Independence:  
Directional line KK indicates that Laborers Local 1140 delivers Ron Kaminski (business 
manager of the union) to Nebraskans for Jobs and Energy Independence, where Kaminski serves 
as president and member of the three-member board of directors (Nonprofit Corporation Biennial 
Report, State of Nebraska,  No. 10140228 Filed April 2, 2011).  Nebraskans for Jobs and Energy 
Independence serves as an active advocacy organization in support of Keystone XL‟s being built 
through the Sand Hills of Nebraska. The financial interest in TransCanada of Kohout, Jensen, 
20 
 
and Kaminski‟s labor union creates a financial conflict of interest situation for Nebraskans for 
Jobs and Energy Independence in terms of distributing fair and objective information about 
Keystone XL‟s ability to provide jobs and energy independence. 
MM.  Professor Hoback’s Delivery to U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service:  Directed line MM 
indicates that Professor Wyatt Hoback of the University of Nebraska-Kearney delivered an 
application for a permit to disturb the habitat of the endangered burying beetle for the purpose of 
research.  Neither party has a conflict because of this action, considered by itself.  
NN.  U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Delivery to Professor Hoback:  Directed line NN 
indicates that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service delivered a permit to Professor Hoback to allow 
him to disturb the habitat of the endangered burying beetle for the purpose of research. There is 
no conflict indicated in this action by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 
OO.  TransCanada Delivery to Professor Hoback:  Directional line OO indicates 
TransCanada‟s delivery of a contract and payment to Professor Hoback for him to utilize his 
permit from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to hire a crew to move the burying beetle, mow 
its habitat, and clean its habitat of its food source along the path of the proposed Keystone XL 
pipeline.  The conflict is that the permit Hoback received was for research, but TransCanada paid 
for it to be used to further its goal of clearing a path for pipeline construction (see PP). 
PP.  Professor Hoback’s Delivery to TransCanada: Directed line PP represents consequences 
of Professor Hoback‟s delivery of activities explained above (see OO). Hoback was paid by 
TransCanada to supervise a crew to complete the beetle removal operation. “The Fish and 
Wildlife Service did not give TransCanada a permit to remove the beetles. Instead, the company 
is working under the supervision of Wyatt Hoback, an entomologist from the University of 
Nebraska Kearney, who has a research permit to study the insects” (Reuters News, October 7, 
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2011). Some groups consider this to be prelicense construction, which is in conflict with the law 
because the removal of the beetle is preparing the construction path before TransCanada received 
a permit to build. Given the conflict, groups have filed a complaint against TransCanada in 
Federal Court (Complaint for Declarative and Injunctive Relief, October 5, 2011). This will 
allow the court, as a disinterested third party, to resolve the conflict. 
QQ. TransCanada’s Delivery to Landowners:  Directed line QQ indicates TransCanada‟s use 
of eminent domain against landowners to acquire the easement to grant pipeline access. The 
company has brought eminent domain actions against landowners in Texas and South Dakota but 
not in Nebraska. “TransCanada Inc. has been threatening to confiscate private land from South 
Dakota to the Gulf of Mexico and is already suing many who have refused to allow the Keystone 
XL pipeline on their property, even though the controversial project has yet to receive federal 
approval” (Omaha World Herald/The New York Times, October 27, 2011). TransCanada is not 
creating this conflict because of Department of State approval for the action. “A senior State 
Department official . . .  said TransCanada had not sought federal approval to invoke eminent 
domain. He said the department had no authority on the issue and that it was up to state law and 
the courts to determine appropriate use of eminent domain laws” (Omaha World Herald/The 
New York Times, October 27, 2011). That does not make it a simple matter for TransCanada. 
“David A. Domina, a Nebraska trial lawyer whose firm studied the Keystone proposal, says it is 
hard to imagine local judges and juries in eminent domain cases—both in initial stages and on 
appeal—siding with a Canadian company against their neighbors” (Bloomberg Businessweek, 
September 5-11, 2011). It is understandable that landowners are concerned about their financial 
interest with regard to easement payments, so both parties have a financial conflict of interest 
involved.  
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Conclusion 
Reviewing the deliveries of Figure 1 one-by-one (letter-by-letter) as was done above should not 
lead us to fail to keep our attention on the system as a whole. By studying Figure 1, we can see 
that when conflicts of interest are allowed to rule behavior in one part of the system, it places 
pressure on other parts to act in conflict with rules and standards; that is, to surrender to the 
moral hazard. By studying Figure 1, we see that correction of misinformation leads others in the 
system either to act to consider the corrected information or to generate more strategic 
misinformation. Which way others react very much depends on the decisions and actions of 
government agencies. It is an ongoing system that is constantly responding to others‟ decisions. 
The more the parties are allowed to act to advance their interests at the expense of the public, the 
more others will join in that behavior. The only way to reverse the escalation of such a system is 
for responsible government agencies to not surrender to such a system. When government 
agencies fail do their job, the moral hazard situation continues to spread, and more private 
organizations will fail to stand for the morality that generates reliable data instead of 
misinformation in the decision making process.  This makes it very important for Department of 
State to enforce rules, laws, and standards; to appoint disinterested parties to be consultants; and 
to be cautious of information from those with a financial conflict of interest.   
 
Notes 
1. There are numerous additional economic issues that need to be analyzed in the 
decision making regarding the Keystone XL pipeline. Examples are as follows:  (1) 
How much will Keystone XL increase monopoly power over pipeline capacity?  (2) 
What impact will the pipeline have on gas and oil prices?  TransCanada has reported 
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that Keystone XL will increase prices in the Midwest, but no analysis is provided.  
Others have stated that it will lower prices.  It is difficult to believe decisions are 
being made on a project without knowing the impact on prices.  (3)  What is the 
impact of the new infrastructure on jobs?  A spokesperson for the American 
Petroleum Institute stated that, “There is no way the building of infrastructure is a job 
loser.”  But, of course, history clarifies that new infrastructure usually leads to the 
loss of jobs.  (4)  What is the impact on costs?  It has been stated that additional 
capital investment in the pipeline will increase costs, but what has been understood, 
at least since Adam Smith, is that increased capitalization increases productivity and 
thereby decreases cost. 
2. The text of the Perryman Group report is 34 pages (with large margins) of repetitive 
statements followed by attached appendixes with numbers that are unexplained and 
undocumented.  Much of the repetitive language is unsubstantiated statements about 
unstable supplies of petroleum from unstable regions of the world, although neither 
M. Ray Perryman nor members of his staff have expertise and/or experience in 
political science or diplomacy.  Nor does the report present the results of any 
statistical studies from the scientific literature or from the Perryman Group‟s own 
statistical analyses to document the relationship between unstable geographic regions 
and erratic global petroleum supplies.  Unsubstantiated statements were all that was 
offered. 
3. There was no concern about costs in the Perryman report.  Information is available 
about the standard level of industrial disease associated with the industry, yet none of 
that information was consulted.  What additional health care costs would be 
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incurred?  What are the monetary costs to businesses and communities from pipeline 
leaks and breaks?  These are real-world concerns that are not pursued in the report.  
In fact, Perryman has an unorthodox economic approach that counts all costs as 
benefits.  All cost expenditures in the report are counted as benefits.  
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